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2. Assault or battery
Berry v. Vollbracht (In re Vollbracht), No. 06-60619, 2007 WL 3144848 (5th Cir. Oct. 24, 2007) (per curiam) (Bankruptcy court failed to consider both subjective and objective routes to willful and malicious injury when it discharged injury from assault conviction. Debtor was convicted of simple assault in Mississippi state court and the defense of self-defense was rejected. Victim sought determination that any civil judgment arising from the assault was nondischargeable under S 523(a)(6). "'The test for willful and malicious injury under S 523(a)(6), [] is condensed into a single inquiry of whether there exists 'either an objective substantial certaintyof harm or a subjective motive to cause harm' on the part of the debtor.' Because debtors generally deny that they had a subjective motive to cause harm, most cases that hold debts to be non-dischargeable do so by determining whether '[the debtor's] actions were at least substantially certain to result in injury.' . . . However, the transcript reveals that the lower courts were concerned mainly that Vollbracht's punches were delivered in self-defense, or at least that Vollbracht was less culpable given Berry's actions. We similarly recognize that an injury levied as a legitimate response to someone else's actions is usually the result of a 'subjective motive to cause harm' and actions that can have an 'objective substantial certainty' of causing harm. Yet such an injury cannot be 'willful and malicious' under S 523(a)(6). Consequently, we hold that our two-part test must countenance the actions of the injured party. That is, for an injury to be 'willful and malicious' it must satisfy our two-part test and not be sufficiently justified under the circumstances to render it not 'willful and malicious.' In applying an objective test for willful and malicious behavior, the district court is not estopped from reconsidering question of self-defense. . . . Just as a court need not defer to a state court decision that relied [sic] a different evidentiary standard, a bankruptcy court need not adopt a criminal assault finding of no self-defense-despite that finding's reliance on the strictest of evidentiary standards-that did not address the dischargeability issue of willful and malicious conduct. . . . Self-defense as litigated in a state criminal trial is not directly transferable to, and certainly not identical, to the question of self-defense in the context of willful and malicious. . . . Although self-defense may be one component of a willful and malicious finding, a court could find willful and malicious injury or lack thereof based on the weight of other evidence not related to self-defense considered by the court.").
In re Granoff, No. 06-4151, 2007 WL 2980190 (3d Cir. Oct. 9, 2007) (Assault by debtor inflicted willful and malicious injury. At a party, a petite woman weighing under 110 pounds struck the debtor in the face. The debtor "an average-sized man" slapped the woman with an open palm. The slap broke the woman's nose and perforated her ear drum. The debtor was convicted of simple assault. "A debtor's actions are willful and malicious under 523(a)(6) 'if they either have a purpose of producing injury or have a substantial certainty of producing injury.'. . . '[L]iabilities arising from assault or assault and battery are generally considered as founded upon a willful and malicious injury and are therefore within the exception.' . . . [Debtor] used disproportionate and excessive force in intentionally striking [plaintiff]. . . .[T]hat Granoff might not have been substantially certain that Bibus's left tympanic membrane would be perforated does not alter the determination that Bibus established by a preponderance of the evidence that Granoff was substantially certain that his striking her would produce some significant injury.").
