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of the Bankruptcy Code, "to make a determination that a state court order is no longer enforceable, and if necessary, to carry out the consequences of such a determination by enjoining the state court action." Moreover, a consent decree, because it is entered upon the stipulation of the parties, takes on the characteristics of a contract and contract principles apply to its enforcement and construction.
Holding: The Settlement voids the Agreed Order and Bartlock can work for Ibis Tek. The State Lawsuit is enjoined from proceeding. Lastly, BAE is sanctioned for breaching the Settlement.
Reasoning: The court first found that it had jurisdiction over the issue and that the matter was core. (The court also found that because the parties consented to the entry of the Settlement and did not appeal it, to the extent the matter was non-core, the parties consented to the entry of a final judgment by the court.) The court did not find BAE's witness to be credible but found Bartock's witnesses to be credible and believable. Because the Settlement was entered upon the parties' agreement, it took on the characteristics of a consent decree and thus was interpreted pursuant to contractual principles. The court found that because Ibis Tek was clearly a special concern, and because the Settlement did not specifically exclude Ibis Tek from its terms, the plain unambiguous language of the Settlement allows Bartlock to work for Ibis Tek. Additionally, at the hearing in which the Settlement was described to the court, the parties similarly did not limit the terms to exclude Ibis Tek. Lastly, the court believes that the terms of the Agreed Order, which provides that it will expire based on, inter alia, an agreement by the parties, is such that once the Settlement was entered the Agreed Order was moot on its terms.
Facts: Telecom Argentina, S.A.'s ("Telecom") went through an acuerdo preventivo extrajudicial ("APE") in Argentina. The Argentine court approved Telecom's APE after Telecom was forced to reorganize its debts when it experienced a severe liquidity crisis that resulted from the Argentina's deep recession that began in late 2001. Argo purchased Telecom notes after Telecom had publicly defaulted on its debts and had begun informal reorganization. Argo continued to purchase Telecom notes before and after the creditor approval of the APE and after the judicial portion of the APE began. Argo also purchased Telecom notes after the entry of the Argentine judgment. Despite its standing to do so, Argo did not participate in either ballot-casting (required by the Argentine court prior to its approval of the APE) or in objecting to the APE prior to court approval. Additionally, Argo did not object to the Argentine court's decision that Telecom met the financial eligibility requirements that were required to file an APE. For U.S. Bank to convert Telecom's old debt into new debt pursuant to the terms of the APE, Telecom filed a petition commencing an ancillary case under § 304 of the Bankruptcy Code. Argo objected to Telecom's petition and argued that the APE did not meet two of the six requirements necessary for a court to grant a § 304 petition. Namely, Argo argued that the APE did not treat creditors justly and that the Argentine proceeding did not merit comity.
